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Abstract. There are many definitions of safety, but most of them are variations on the theme 
that safety can be measured by the number of adverse outcomes and must be enforced by 
using more of the same safety measures (e.g. more procedures). What the industry thinks 
safety is, and how it can be achieved are both questionable. This article looks at six safety-
related assumptions, or safety myths, which can be found across most industry practices. 
These myths are related to human error, procedure compliance, protection and safety, root 
causes, accident investigation, and ‘safety first’. We argue that while relying on such myths 
makes safety management easier, they also make it flawed and ineffective. Therefore, we 
propose a critical discussion leading to a set of managerial messages. In this paper, we present 
the six myths in sequence, and then discard them through the analysis of various industrial 
examples. We then replace the myths with six clearer statements in order to build an 
alternative view of safety. 
Keywords. Industrial safety; safety management; human error; procedure compliance; 
protection and safety; root causes; accident investigation; safety first
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1 ON MYTHS AND SAFETY
In the best of all possible worlds, safety is managed by highly trained and rational people 
using carefully chosen indicators and effective methods. In reality, safety management is 
usually a collection of best practices based on a number of assumptions that are taken for 
granted, hence rarely discussed. Examples include the traditional dictum of ‘safety first’, the 
belief that increasing protection will increase safety, or the notion that most accidents are 
caused by human error. These, and other, assumptions are common to many (if not all) 
industrial sectors and determine both individual attitudes, corporate policies and regulatory 
practices. Since these assumptions express common beliefs rather than facts, they are not 
verifiable and can therefore be considered as myths.
This paper will consider six major safety myths and try to challenge them on the basis of 
alternative views. The origin of these myths is first-hand interaction with the industry during 
consultancy work. More precisely, they originate from direct exchanges that took place with 
(or material that was gathered from) large European companies. The selection of the myths 
was done on the basis of the perceived frequency of occurrence and the potential impact on 
safety. Strictly speaking, we cannot claim that these myths are representative of the beliefs 
held by the industry. However, because they are implicit indicators of a safety culture, these 
myths might be regarded as the building blocks of an industrial safety policy. For these 
reasons, the discussion of the myths that follows is not a rhetorical exercise but aims to 
disseminate scientifically-informed managerial messages.
1.1 Myths do matter
For the scope of this paper, an assumption is something that is taken for granted rather than 
verified. Assumptions, whether as hunches, guesses, or hypotheses, are an important and 
essential part of human activity since we rarely have sufficient time to make sure that what we 
assume is actually true (Hollnagel, 2009a). While assumptions are usually considered in 
relation to what individuals think and do, they may also be shared among social or 
professional groups. This is illustrated by the common definition of safety culture as “that  
assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes  
that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by  
their significance” (INSAG, 1986). Schein’s (1992) definition of organisational culture is also 
relevant here: it is “a pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved 
its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to  
be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to  
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” Many people happily accept 
definitions such as these without reflecting on what they actually mean or imply. It is taken 
for granted that they are sensible, simply because everybody else uses them.
The step from an assumption to a myth is not very large. A myth is an idea or story that many 
people believe, but which is not true. This definition emphasises both the fictional aspect of 
myths and their social nature. And because they express simple ‘truths’, they are also 
excellent vehicles for communication.
In the industrial world everyone, from the sharp end to the blunt end, seems to share a number 
of safety-related myths. Risk, in particular, is a social object that is affected by many biases 
(Bohnenblust & Slovic, 1998). For instance, a manager might believe that in their company, 
safety comes first. However, the reality of field operations is almost always that people 
implement workarounds and safety trade-offs so that their task can be completed given the 
available resources and the constraints at play. Therefore, our objective in discussing myths is 
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to encourage reflection among the stakeholders of industrial safety, and to propose some 
alternatives from which new safety practices may be derived. 
1.2. Safety
The definition of safety usually refers to the absence of unwanted outcomes, either simply as 
the freedom from unacceptable risk, or tongue-in-cheek as “a dynamic non-event” (Weick, 
2001, p. 335). For the discussion in this paper, we will adopt the following working 
definition: Safety is the system property that is necessary and sufficient to ensure that the  
number of events that could be harmful to workers, the public or the environment is  
acceptably low. This definition of safety emphasises the relative nature of the concept: safe 
systems produce acceptably low numbers of unwanted events. Alternatively, safety can be 
seen as producing an affordable number of unwanted events, as captured by the As-Low-As-
Reasonably-Praticable principle (Woodruff, 2005). This is the starting point for looking at 
safety assumptions as well as some aspects of the industrial safety culture. In doing so, we 
will rely on a human factors perspective (see for instance Norman, 1988; Vicente, 2003), even 
though it has not yet been fully integrated into all industrial safety practices. 
In this paper, it would be impossible to provide an extensive discussion of all existing safety-
related myths. Instead, we will look at six of them (see for instance Allinson, 2007 for more), 
provide a short description and attempt to analyse the underlying assumptions. We will do so 
by providing examples and by referring to evidence that supports reconsidering the 
assumptions. We end the discussion of each myth with a short alternative formulation.
2 HUMAN ERROR
2.1 The myth
Human error is the largest single cause of accidents and incidents.
2.2 Description and criticism
The web announcement for the Intersec Trade Fair and Conference (held in Dubai, January 
2010), included the following topic under the heading Latest News: “Human error is involved 
in over 90% of all accidents and injuries in a workplace” (Intersec, 2009). 
Numerous books and papers have been written about human error. An increasing number of 
them openly question the simple-minded use of the term (e.g. Dekker, 2005; Hollnagel & 
Amalberti, 2001; Woods et al., 1994). Yet as the above announcement shows, the myth of 
human error as the cause of most accidents prevails. Human error is also a fundamental focus 
of many accident investigation methods and, of course, the very foundation of human 
reliability assessment. The tradition is old; one of the early candidates for a theory to explain 
industrial accidents was a single-factor model of accident proneness (Greenwood & Woods, 
1919). In methods such as root cause analysis, for instance, the ‘human error’ level often 
marks the maximum depth of analysis, in the sense that a human error is accepted as the root 
cause. In human reliability assessment the focus is still the Human Error Probability (HEP), 
despite numerous criticisms (e.g. Dougherty, 1990; Hollnagel, 2000). The concept of human 
error became part of safety lore when Heinrich (1931, p. 43) noted that as improved 
equipment and methods were introduced, “accidents from purely mechanical or physical  
causes decreased, and man failure became the predominating cause of injury.” This 
assumption became the second of the five dominoes in the famous domino model, described 
as “Fault of person – proximate reason for committing unsafe act, or for existence of  
mechanical or physical hazard” (Heinrich, 1934, p. 1). Observers of the human mind, 
philosophers and psychologists alike, have studied human error at least since the days of 
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David Hume (see Hollnagel, 2000), and have generally treated human error as an individual 
characteristic or a personality trait. A good example of this is the zero-risk hypothesis of 
driving (Summala, 1985; 1988), which proposes that drivers aim to keep their subjectively 
perceived risk at zero-level. 
Our daily lives are littered with instances of the expression ‘human error’. They can be found 
in the news, in accident reports, in public statements, etc. Recent examples include a news 
item reported by the BBC (2009) about a software problem with Google’s search services 
where a ‘human error’ by a Google employee caused all search results to be unduly flagged as 
malevolent. Also, the French radio station France Info (Colombain, 2009) announced that a 
(programming) ‘human error’ in a piece of software, handling operations on bank accounts at 
the French BNP bank, caused almost 600,000 debits or credits to be performed two or three 
times.
The futility of using human error as a cause of accidents can be demonstrated by the following 
argument. If we consider a safe system to be one where the probability of failure is low, e.g., 
10-5, then there will be at least 99.999 cases of acceptable performance for every case of 
unacceptable performance. In other words, accidents will be quite rare. If the so-called 
‘human error’ is the cause of the event that goes wrong, what the cause is of all the other 
events that go right? In our opinion, the only possible answer is: humans. Humans try to make 
sure that their actions produce the intended effect. However, they behave in the same manner 
regardless of whether the outcomes of their actions turn out to be positive or negative, simply 
because they cannot know that at the time of acting. It follows that ‘human error’ should not 
be used to explain adverse outcomes since it invokes an ad hoc 'mechanism'. Instead, a more 
productive view is to try to understand how performance varies, and determine why the 
behaviour that usually makes things go right occasionally makes things go wrong.
2.3 A possible revision of the myth
‘Human error’ is an artefact of a traditional engineering view, which treats humans as if they  
were (fallible) machines and overlooks how performance adjustments are used to match  
activities to the working conditions.
The expression ‘human error’ contains assumptions that are counter-productive for the 
effective understanding of things that have gone wrong. To start with, it is a judgement; a 
loaded term that implies some form of wrongdoing and asks for a culprit to be found. What is 
more, it is a judgement made after the outcome of an action has become known, and is 
therefore heavily influenced by the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975; Woods et al., 1994; 
2010). It is also in practice limited to people at the sharp end, i.e., the operators who are 
directly involved with the process. There are two main reasons for it. First, the consequences 
of actions are seen almost immediately at the sharp end. It is therefore deceptively easy to 
associate adverse outcomes with the preceding actions, and therefore also easy to blame the 
people at the sharp end. Second, in a safety culture that focuses on mistakes and sanctions, 
blaming someone establishes or maintains a power or authority gradient, which makes 
management prone to follow the hierarchy to its bottom where the sharp end is conventionally 
found (Hollnagel, 2004). However, actual work is subject to constraints that are imposed by 
managers and the higher strata of organisations. This must be taken into account in trying to 
understand how and when performance varies. Finally, ‘human error’ focuses on hypothetical 
psychological or cognitive mechanisms and pays little attention to the context of work. This 
narrows the cause of mishaps to people’s actions, without including how and why operators 
adjust their performance, i.e. how to “bridge the gap between what must be done and what  
can be done” (Runte, 2010, p. 3).
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3 PROCEDURE COMPLIANCE
3.1 The myth
Systems will be safe if people comply with the procedures they have been given.
3.2 Description and criticism
Generally speaking, procedures are essential references for how to carry out a given task. 
They act, for example, as memory aids, or as guides for decisions in situations where people 
have little or no experience. Procedures vary in nature, size and complexity and may range 
from a six-line cooking recipe to entire bookshelves of ring binders in control rooms of 
nuclear power plants. The safety myth is that safety can be ensured by procedure compliance 
and conversely that safety is jeopardised by non-compliance. 
There is an entrenched belief in the correctness of engineering design, as well as in e.g. the 
design of interfaces,  work specifications and procedures. When any of these fail, the 
explanation is typically found as to be 'human error' or as a case of violation or non-
compliance. The frequent use of non-compliance as an explanation shows that there is a 
strong belief that everything would go well if only people would follow procedures, rules, and 
regulations. The belief in procedures is demonstrated by the fact that their number usually 
keeps growing, even after it has reached a level where procedures cease to be useful. The 
standard recommendation from a large number of accidents is to reinforce procedure 
compliance, or even to propose new procedures.
The compliance bias implies that humans, as fallible machines, are a source of uncontrollable 
variability that contributes to the occurrence of unsafe events. The assumption is that 
complying with the procedure will not only get the job done, but will also get it done well, 
i.e., safely. In relation to safety, the idea that safe and effective performance requires
procedure compliance reflects the principles of Scientific Management (Taylor, 1911) and 
also the assumption that people can be considered as machines – possibly complex ones, but 
machines nonetheless. 
Looking at procedures from a human factors standpoint tells a somewhat different story. 
Procedure compliance will not always guarantee safety. One reason is that procedures are 
inherently underspecified both in scope and in depth: a procedure cannot cover all possible 
configurations a worker might face when performing a task, nor can it precisely and 
exhaustively describe what a worker has to do, how, and when. Numerous studies tell us that 
humans overcome these limitations by interpreting the procedure vis-a-vis the situation and by 
adjusting it when necessary (Schulman et al., 2004). Humans also rely on their experience to 
interpret procedures when actions are described in fuzzy terms such as ‘enough’, ‘quickly’, 
‘slowly’, etc. 
An example of operators reacting to an exception by adapting a procedure is the near-loss and 
recovery of the Snorre A offshore platform (Wackers, 2006; Figure 1). 
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On 28th November, 2004, one of the gas wells attached to the platform started to leak from the 
seabed. The leak was serious enough for a large gas cloud to build up around the platform, 
exposing the entire installation to a high risk of explosion. Under such circumstances, safety 
procedures stipulated that the platform must be evacuated. However, applying this procedure 
meant that the leak would be left unplugged, and that the unattended platform would be 
exposed to potential destruction. Should this happen, the platform would sink and crash onto 
the seabed, obliterating the wells themselves and making the plugging of the leak impossible 
for a considerable time. With such a catastrophic scenario in mind, and taking into account the 
long-term consequences, the platform manager decided to remain aboard the platform with a 
small team in order to plug the well with concrete. They succeeded, stopped the leak, and 
were able to put the platform back into service; it still is in service today.
In this case, the mandatory compliance with a safety procedure was deliberately disregarded 
in order to respond proactively to the potential evolution of a catastrophic situation. Although 
the objection can be made that this analysis benefits from hindsight, the reaction to the event 
at the time is a clear demonstration of a ‘safe violation’ (Besnard & Greathead, 2003). In the 
analysis of this case, we wish to highlight that the mere departure from a procedure cannot a 
priori be interpreted as an impediment to safety. The conditions under which such departures 
from procedures lead to expected consequences is a crucial question, but one that falls outside 
of the scope of this research.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the 
Snorre A platform showing the wells on  
the seabed between thefour tension legs  
(from Wackers, 2006)
3.3 A possible revision of the myth
Actual working situations usually differ from what the procedures assume and strict  
compliance may be detrimental to both safety and efficiency. Procedures should be used 
carefully and intelligently.
Safe operations cannot be ensured by rigid and blind compliance. Instead they require that 
operators assess the adequacy of, and adapt, procedures to operational conditions (Dien, 1998; 
Besnard, 2006). Humans constantly perform this assessment and fill in the gaps between the 
assumed and actual conditions of their task. This is why there is always a difference between 
work as imagined and work as done. Given that it is impossible to anticipate all the possible 
configurations of a work situation and prescribe each and every step of an activity, industrial 
operations depend on these adjustments. Therefore, strict procedure compliance may actually 
have detrimental consequences since it will limit the beneficial effects of human adaptation in 
response to underspecification of the work situation. A good example of this is the situation 
where people ‘work to rule’ to express their dissatisfaction with working conditions, or 
Vicente's (1999) description of malicious compliance.
4 PROTECTION AND SAFETY
4.1 The myth
Safety can be improved by barriers and protection; increasing the layers of protection leads 
to higher safety.
4.2 Description and criticism
Practically all definitions of safety (see for instance ICAO1 or WHO2) define safety as the 
absence of accidents or as the freedom from unacceptable risks. It follows from this that 
safety can be achieved either by eliminating risks or by protecting against their effects. At first 
glance it seems reasonable to expect that safety is higher the more protection there is, and the 
better designed it is. It is the philosophy behind safety in many systems such as motor 
vehicles, where multiple active and passive safety systems (Anti Blocking System, crumple 
zones, safety belts, airbags, etc.) protect drivers from physical injury. It is also the philosophy 
behind the concept of defence-in-depth (INSAG, 1996). This notion has been institutionalised 
by the nuclear industry (IAEA3) and is seen in practice in most workplaces. The physical 
structure of industrial plants demonstrate the steadfast adherence to the principle of multiple 
barriers. However, multiple barriers only lead to higher levels of safety if they always 
function as intended. The latter is rarely the case.
. 
As far as individuals are concerned,the relation between risk exposure and protection is not 
simple. In the case of protective equipment, one factor is the expected utility of being 
protected versus being unprotected. A rule of thumb is that protection will be used when the 
feedback from not being protected is negative, immediate and tangible. In the absence of 
negative feedback, using a protection might be disregarded, even if life is at stake. An 
example is the safety belt in cars. It is obviously possible, although risky, to drive for an entire 
lifetime without using the safety belt and without having an accident. As a matter of fact, this 
was the norm until a few decades ago. The message here is that the perceived consequence of 
risk exposure is a strong determinant of human behaviour, which may defeat the purpose of 
1 International Civil Aviation Organisation
2 World Health Organisation
3 International Atomic Energy Agency
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barriers and protection. The weaker the link between risk exposure and consequences, the less 
likely it is that a protection will be used. The psychological explanation is that the potential 
negative outcomes are less salient (or available; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
There are two main reasons why more protection is not necessarily better. One is 
psychological and has to do with risk homeostasis (Wilde, 1994) whereby people adjust their 
risk exposure to the perceived level of protection. The classical example is the introduction of 
the ABS braking system in the automotive industry. A large-scale study conducted by 
Aschenbrenner and Biehl (1994; quoted by Wilde, 1994) showed that taxi drivers whose cars 
were equipped with ABS tended to drive more aggressively. The other interesting result was 
that the drivers of ABS-equipped vehicles had an accident rate that was slightly higher than 
that of the other taxi drivers. This clearly demonstrates the counter-intuitive nature of the 
human response to increased protection. Another example is the consequence of equipping 
winding Finnish country roads with reflector posts: people drove faster and closer to the edge 
of the road, thereby vastly increasing the number of accidents at night (Hamer, 1991). 
The second reason why more protection is not necessarily better is technical. Adding 
protection invariably increases the complexity of the system, regardless of how that is 
measured (more components, more couplings, etc.). The added components or functions may 
not only fail themselves, but will also significantly increase the number of combinations that 
can lead to unwanted and undesired outcomes. In addition to making common mode failures 
more likely, this also makes understanding the system more difficult.
4.3 A possible revision of the myth
Technology is not value neutral. Additional protection changes behaviour so that the intended 
safety improvements might not be obtained.
Expected increases in safety from additional barriers and protection can be defeated by 
psychological reactions. The introduction of new and better (safer) technology should not be 
treated as the simple replacement of one function by another. Any change will affect the 
established equilibrium, and people will usually respond by changing their behaviour. The 
risk homeostasis hypothesis described above is one illustration of that. A more general 
expression of this principle is found in the Law of stretched systems, originally proposed by 
Lawrence Hirschhorn. The law states that:
“Under resource pressure, the benefits of change are taken in increased productivity, pushing  
the system back to the edge of the performance envelope” (quoted in Woods & Cook, 2002, p. 
141).
This means that every system is stretched to operate at its full capacity and that any 
(technological) improvement will be exploited to achieve a new intensity and tempo of 
activity. Rather than simply enabling humans to manage existing risks better, additional 
barriers and protection may lead people to take greater risks in order to improve efficiency. Of 
course, this does not mean that less protection is the way to improve safety or that increased 
protection never works. It only means that one should carefully consider both the intended 
and the unintended effects of implementing protection in socio-technical systems.
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5 MISHAPS AND ROOT CAUSES
5.1 The myth
Root cause analysis can identify why mishaps happen in complex socio-technical systems.
5.2 Description and criticism
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a generic term referring to a family of methods used to find the 
various causal factors that can explain a specific adverse outcome such as an accident (for a 
review, see Livingston, Jackson & Priestley, 2001). This approach is widely applied in many 
industries. The basic steps of RCA are: determine what happened, determine why it happened 
(by going stepwise backwards from an effect to the causes) and finally, find ways to reduce 
the possibility that it will happen again. RCA assumes that the parts of a system are causally 
related so that effects propagate in an orderly fashion. This assumption justifies the idea that 
cause-effect links are followed in reverse order to discover where the problem started. In this 
way, the various steps are mapped out in a tree-like diagram of causes (Figure 2).
RCA is deeply embedded within safety-related practices in the industry. It is also widely 
taught, to the extent that there are certificates for people who have completed courses. In the 
field of healthcare (patient safety) it is the most commonly used method. This also applies to 
other sectors of the industry. In a survey of risk analysis practices in the Norwegian oil and 
gas industry, Andersen and Mostue (2011) report that 80% of surveyed companies use Fault 
Tree Analysis (a analysis method belonging to the RCA family). The most cited method that 
includes human, technical and organisational dimensions is the Norwegian CRIOP, which is 
cited by less than 60% of respondents. These figures are in sharp contrast with the use of 
recent systemic methods such as FRAM or STAMP which are reported as being in use in less 
than 10% of the companies surveyed.
One of the reasons why root cause analysis is attractive to the industry might be its 
decompositional nature. However, the validity of its methods depends on the critical 
assumption that outcomes of specific events are bimodal; i.e., outcomes are either correct or 
incorrect (Hollnagel, 2009a). This view is not tenable for the performance of all technical 
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Figure 2: An example of a method belonging to root cause analysis: a  
fish-bone model of a car accident and causes
systems (Manion, 2007), let alone complex socio-technical systems. Indeed, in the latter case, 
individual and collective human performance normally varies considerably but rarely fails 
completely. And even when performance for some reason fails, humans can individually or 
collectively recover from failure and resume normal operation. In short, the very flexibility 
and adaptability of human performance is a unique contribution to safety (Reason, 2009). Yet 
this flexibility is disregarded when a root cause analysis points to a human as the origin of an 
unwanted event. The analysis only sees the failure (see Section ) and fails to recognise that 
things go right and wrong for the same reasons. The possible elimination of the human 
activity that was deemed the cause of the outcome will therefore also eliminate the far more 
frequent and far more probable positive contribution.
The preference for clear and simple methods has both psychological and pragmatic 
explanations. The psychological explanation is what the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm 
Nietzsche (2007; org. 1895, p. 33) called the error of imaginary causes:
“To trace something unfamiliar back to something familiar is at once a relief, a comfort and 
a satisfaction, while it also produces a feeling of power. The unfamiliar involves danger,  
anxiety and care – the fundamental instinct is to get rid of these painful circumstances. First  
principle – any explanation is better than none at all.”
5.3 A possible revision of the myth
Human performance cannot be described as if it was bimodal. In socio-technical systems,  
things that go wrong happen in the same way as things that go right.
This means that there are many cases where root cause analysis cannot – and should not – be 
used. Fortunately, there are several alternatives that are more appropriate. One is the well-
established MTO approach that considers huMan, Technical and Organisational factors either 
alone or in combination. This approach has been used by both nuclear and off-shore industries 
for more than twenty years (Rollenhagen, 1995). Another is the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 
1990), which offers a high-level view of how latent conditions can combine with active 
failures and thereby lead to unexpected and unwanted outcomes. A more recent proposal is 
STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes; Leveson, 2004). STAMP is a 
causal analysis method based on a systems theory model that makes a number of assumptions 
about how the general system is structured. On a different tack, the Functional Resonance 
Analysis Method (FRAM) replaces the cause-effect relation by the concept of functional 
resonance (Hollnagel, 2004; Woltjer & Hollnagel, 2007). This approach provides a way to 
describe unexpected events as emerging from the low-amplitude variability of everyday 
performance.
6 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
6.1 The myth
Accident investigation is the logical and rational identification of causes based on facts.
6.2 Description and criticism
The purpose of accident investigation is to discover the causes of unexpected and adverse 
outcomes. However, the number of serious unwanted outcomes is so large that it is impossible 
to investigate them all. Furthermore, when unwanted events do get investigated, it is often 
necessary that the results are ready by a certain deadline, for judicial reasons, for 
communication purposes, or because of a lack of resources. Because of that, the depth or 
extent of analysis, the methods deployed, or the choice of data that are scrutinised are not 
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simply determined by the particulars of the case at hand (its complexity, severity, potential for 
learning, etc.). In addition, resources and demands dictate what will be done and how it should 
be done. The management of the investigation then becomes a trade-off between what can be 
done and what should be done: a trade-off between efficiency and thoroughness (Hollnagel, 
2009a). 
In practice, accident investigations always imply some assumptions about how accidents 
happen and what one should do to prevent them (Lundberg et al., 2009). For example, Benner 
(1985) evaluated the merits of seventeen investigation methodologies from the USA, and 
found considerable differences in their effectiveness. Accident investigation guidelines 
embody a set of assumptions about how accidents happen, what the important factors are, and 
how events can best be prevented in the future. They also define an implicit (and sometimes 
explicit) norm for what a satisfactory investigation is. 
Another bias is the need to establish responsibilities. This can turn the identification of causes 
of an event into a secondary issue. This approach is paramount within judicial enquiries. A 
recent example is the crash of a Rafale air fighter in December 2007 in France, causing the 
death of the pilot. Shortly after the accident, a representative of the French Air Force declared 
on a national radio station that all of those responsible would be identified by the 
investigation.  This can be a major obstacle to safety because it confuses responsibility and 
cause. At best, it makes it easier to find who to blame next time a similar event occurs. But it 
also means that the investigation fails to meet any common criteria for rationality. As Woods 
et al. (1994, p. xvii) put it, “attributing error to the actions of some person, team, or  
organisation is fundamentally a social and psychological process and not an objective,  
technical one.”
6.3 A possible revision of the myth
Accident investigation is a social process, where causes are constructed rather than found.
An accident investigation must be systematic, hence follow a method or a procedure. The 
purpose is, however, not to find causes but to build explanations. There are many different 
methods available (Benner, 1985; Sklet, 2002), both between and within domains, and these 
may differ with respect to how well formulated and how well founded they are. The method 
will direct the investigation to look at certain things and not at others. Indeed, it is simply not 
possible to begin an investigation with a completely open mind, just as it is not possible 
passively to ‘see’ what is there. Accident investigations can aptly be characterised as 
conforming to the What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find (WYLFIWYF) principle 
(Hollnagel, 2008b; Lundberg et al., 2009).
7 SAFETY FIRST
7.1 The myth
Safety always has the highest priority and will never be compromised.
7.2 Description and criticism
This is by far the most commonly heard myth in the realm of safety management. Here, the 
assumption is that safety is an absolute priority in the sense that it cannot be compromised. An 
instance of this myth appeared in a statement by the Chief Executive Officer of Air France, in 
the aftermath of the AF 447 accident (Amedeo & Ducros, 2009): 
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“The company is safe. It was safe yesterday, it is safe now but it will be even safer tomorrow.  
Because everything will be scrutinized: the mechanical parts, human factors, the weather.  
Every possible accident scenario will be analysed. Everything will be looked at and we will  
improve the elements that may be related to the accident as well as others that are not. There  
is no contradiction between safety and economy. When safety improves, it improves the image 
of the company and therefore also improves its economic performance. There has never been 
any trade-off between these two areas. For example, it is clearly written that pilots should fly  
around thunderstorms. There is no question of saving on fuel. Pilots are free to choose their  
route.”
Statements like these are often used because they are concise and suited for communication 
purposes. They basically express a value that is both clear and noble. If one looks at the safety 
management of an industry such as commercial aviation in western countries, there are clear 
examples of ‘safety first’. One is scheduled maintenance for aircraft. At regular intervals, 
every wide-body commercial aircraft goes through total dismantling, down to the very last 
piece of wire, and is then rebuilt with the necessary upgrades or replacement parts. It is hard 
to be more dedicated to safety than that. To our knowledge, aviation is the only industry to 
have adopted such a radical practice, at least in principle. In practice however, economic 
considerations may sometimes lead to compromises with the schedule (Woltjer & Hollnagel, 
2007).
One can also find a discrepancy between policy statements and reality. One example is 
provided by an assessment of safety behaviour and culture at the BP Texas City refinery that 
was carried out between 8th and 30th November 2004. In 2004, BP Texas City had the lowest 
injury rate in its history, nearly one-third the average of the oil refinery sector. In the 
following year, on 23rd March 2005, a major explosion occurred in an isomerisation unit at the 
site, killing fifteen workers and injuring more than 170 others. This was the worst American 
industrial accident in over a decade. The 2004 study interviewed 112 individuals to solicit 
their views on a number of issues (Telos, 2005). They were asked to rank their perception of 
the priorities at the Texas City site, using a set of given options. For the purposes of this 
discussion, the most interesting finding was that the first three choices were Making money, 
Cost/budget and Production, respectively. Major Incident and Security only came in fifth and 
seventh position.
Safety has financial implications that cannot be ignored and it is understandable that costs do 
have an influence on the choice and feasibility of safety measures. It is all the more 
understandable because the costs are real and immediate whereas the benefits are potential 
and distant in time. A further complication is that safety performance is often measured by the 
relative reduction in the number of situations where things go wrong rather than as an increase 
in the number of situations where things go right. This means that there is less and less to 
measure as safety improves. The lack of information can then be (mis)interpreted to mean that 
the process is under control, when in actual fact the opposite might be the case.
7.3 A possible revision of the myth
Safety will be as high as affordable – from a financial and ethical perspective.
An illustration that ‘safety first’ is a relative rather than an absolute statement is provided by 
Negroni (2009):
“In October, the agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, issued an operations bulletin  
for ‘ultra-long-range flights’ that doubled the amount of time that pilots and flight attendants  
must remain at their overseas destination. The change to 48 hours from 24 was intended to  
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ensure that flight crews got two full periods of sleep before making the return flight. But  
seven airlines have asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington to  
set aside the new requirements, arguing that they would impose ‘substantial burdens and 
costs.”
In other words, safety comes first if the organisation can afford it. If not, safety is traded off 
against economy. It is not realistic to expect that all possible safety measures, however good 
they may be, can be implemented without prioritisation, or without considering feasibility and 
consequences. This was clearly illustrated in the reactions to the eruption of the 
Eyjafjällajökull volcano in April 2010. The safety-centred initial response was to close most 
of the European airspace. But after some time other concerns became more important. On 19th
April for example, the 27 European Union transport ministers, in a meeting with 
representatives of the air transport industry, agreed to (partly) resume flying after taking both 
safety and economic considerations into account. It is inevitable that air safety is traded-off 
against other concerns. Indeed, if safety really was the overriding priority, the few aviation 
accidents that occur annually in e.g. western Europe would be a sufficient reason to ground all 
flights. 
8 DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have looked at six commonly held safety assumptions and compared them to 
actual practices, policies, and scientific knowledge. The assumptions were seen as myths for 
the following reasons: 
• They are shared by large groups of people inside and outside of companies, including
managers, politicians, and sometimes the public, and can be found in various industrial
sectors and social contexts.
• They express a set of attitudes and values that determine decisions and actions related
to safety.
• They are not usually noticed or questioned.
• They resist change.
• They cannot be verified.
Safety involves all layers of organisations, from operators to CEOs, as well as society in the 
form of investigation boards, regulators, and the courts. Since the myths permeate every layer, 
the practice of safety is affected everywhere. Taken together these myths, and potentially 
others, are part of the common safety culture, i.e., the pattern of shared assumptions that affect 
how we perceive, think, and respond to adverse outcomes. Because they are myths and 
therefore rarely questioned, it will take more than just facts and reason to undo them and 
alleviate their effects. An alternative approach may be to consider the object of safety myths, 
namely safety itself.
First, instead of defining safety solely as a system property, we argue that safety should also 
be seen as a process. Safety is not something a system has, it is something a system does. 
Safety is under constant negotiation, and the way that safety is managed varies continuously 
in response to, and in anticipation of, changes in operating conditions – as well as changes in 
demands and resources. Therefore, from an operational point of view, it is crucial to 
understand how an organisation produces safety. 
Second, we would like to emphasise that the goal of safety should be to increase what goes 
right rather than to reduce what goes wrong. Consequently, safety indicators should measure 
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what goes right rather than what goes wrong. Today we have many methods that focus on 
unsafe functioning but few, if any, that focus on safe functioning. Yet the aim of safety should 
not only be to reduce the number of adverse events. It should also improve the ability to 
succeed under varying conditions. This is consistent with the principles of resilience 
engineering (e.g. Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006; Hollnagel et al., 2011), which defines 
safety as the ability of an organisation to succeed under varying conditions. Therefore, the 
preoccupation with what goes wrong overlooks what allows an organisation to sustain 
acceptable everyday performance. 
In light of this, it seems odd that safety is measured by simple, context-free performance 
indicators such as fatality rates or accident tallies. Safety should rather be tied to indicators 
that account for the way an organisation maintains its stability through changing conditions. 
Such indicators can be the effectiveness of control of the process at hand, the amount of 
available resources, the degree of social acceptance, the level of sustained effectiveness, the 
quality of outcomes, and so on. These indicators are compatible with resilience engineering, 
where safety comprises the abilities to respond, to monitor, to anticipate, and to learn 
(Hollnagel, 2009b). This view is consistent with Slovic’s (2001) plea that traditional safety 
measurements (fatality rates or accident frequencies) should be combined with others, in order 
to measure the efficiency of the (safety) process rather than the number of outcomes. As 
disturbing as it might seem, this would recognise the way that safety is actually managed: as a 
complicated trade-off. 
9 CONCLUSION
Together, the myths discussed here represent a conviction that it is possible to achieve safety 
by properly engineering systems, including the people who work in them. This is congruent 
with the view that safety is simply the absence of failures. More precisely, it is assumed that 
systems work because: (1) systems are well designed and scrupulously maintained, (2) 
procedures are complete and correct; (3) people do what they have been taught or trained to 
do; and (4) system designers are able to foresee and anticipate every contingency (Hollnagel, 
2008a). Taken together the myths describe well-tested and well-behaved systems where 
human performance variability clearly is a liability and where the human inability to perform 
in an expected manner is a risk. 
While the above view may have been reasonable fifty years ago (and even that can be 
disputed), it is clearly not reasonable today. One question is therefore: why do these myths 
still exist? In our opinion, one reason is that they simply do not get questioned. In turn, this 
might be because managing safety on a day-to-day basis is more a matter of producing and 
managing conventional indicators (Chaplin, 2009; Hopkins, 2009) or complying with safety 
checks (Hodkingson, 2009) than understanding and anticipating, e.g. the causes of mishaps. 
Therefore, we need to discard the existing myths and instead replace them with clearer 
statements. For the six myths considered in this paper, the following revisions were proposed:
• ‘Human error’ is an artefact of a traditional engineering view, which treats humans
as if they were (fallible) machines and overlooks how performance adjustments are
used to match the working conditions.
• Actual working situations usually differ from what the procedures assume and strict
compliance may be detrimental to both safety and efficiency. Procedures should be
used carefully and intelligently.
• Technology is not value neutral. Additional protection changes behaviour so that the
intended safety improvements might not be obtained.
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• Human performance cannot be described as if it was bimodal. In socio-technical
systems, things that go wrong happen in the same way as things that go right.
• Accident investigation is a social process, where causes are constructed rather than found.
• Safety will be as high as affordable – from a financial and ethical perspective.
According to this revised view, complex socio-technical systems work because: (1) people 
learn to identify and overcome design flaws and functional glitches; (2) people can adjust 
their performance to the current conditions (resources and demands); (3) people can interpret 
and apply procedures to match the situation; and (4) people can detect when something is 
about to go wrong, and intervene before the situation becomes seriously worsened. This 
means that systems work because people are flexible and adaptive, rather than because the 
systems have been perfectly thought out and designed.
We live in a complex world, where work takes place in conditions of multiple interacting 
technical, financial, cultural and political constraints. Doing things perfectly under such 
conditions is hardly a feasible option. But a view of safety management that involves 
complicated trade-offs does not blend well with the ideal of a well thought-through 
endeavour, driven by scientific knowledge and practices, and conducted by rational people. 
The safety myths described in this paper all derive from this ideal. As myths, they are counter-
productive because they lead to unrealistic safety management attitudes, policies and targets. 
In order to have any chance of successfully operating increasingly complex socio-technical 
systems, we need to abandon the myths and the idealised approach to safety that they imply.
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